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Delegitimising Nuclear
Violence
 Nick Richie
 
 December, in Vienna, saw the third in-
ternational conference on the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons.1 Next April will see the 
2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and 
next August will mark the 70th anniversary of the nucle-
ar bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All three events 
give us an occasion to pause, and, in different ways, to re-
flect on the continuing challenge of nuclear violence and 
on the global nuclear order we have constructed for our-
selves.
 
 Nuclear weapons mean different things to differ-
ent people. In fact, it is difficult to understand national 
and global nuclear politics without considering the mean-
ings or values assigned to these weapons. These values are 
about more than status and prestige. 
 In the UK, for example, nuclear weapons are as-
signed multiple meanings: domestic political value, not 
least around high-skilled jobs; identity value in terms of 
national role conceptions about who we think we are and 
how we should act in the world; institutional value in terms 
of the entrenched political privilege ascribed to the nucle-
ar-armed P5 in institutions of global security governance; 
international order value in terms of the long-term gener-
al stability among the world’s major powers attributed to 
nuclear weapons; relational value in terms of assured pro-
tection against specific adversaries (for the UK , the Rus-
sian bogeyman); and an operational value in terms of the 
value assigned to operating nuclear weapons in a ‘proper’ 
way (for the UK, nuclear-armed submarines permanently 
at sea on continuous alert).2 
 Together this set of values constitutes a specific 
‘regime of nuclear truth’: a social, historical and generally 
elite discourse that legitimises and institutionalises what 
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The Marshall Islands’ Two-
Front Fight to Survive and 
Thrive: Climate Protection 
and Nuclear Disarmament
  John Burroughs
“No one’s drowning, baby,” went the poem 
by Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner of the Marshall Islands 
that she read to the UN Climate Summit on 
September 23, 2014. “No one’s moving/no one’s losing 
their homeland/no one’s becoming a climate change 
refugee.” Why? “Because we baby are going to fight/your 
mommy daddy/bubu jimma your country and your 
president too/we will all fight.” And:  “Because we deserve 
to do more than just/survive/we deserve/to thrive.”
And indeed the Marshall Islands is working hard 
to help make productive the negotiations about to begin 
on a new climate agreement. In August 2013, leaders of 
Pacific Island Forum states meeting in Majuro, the capital 
of the Marshall Islands, adopted a declaration setting 
forth commitments to implement national reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions and to accelerate efforts to adapt 
to climate change. A stated aim of the Majuro Declaration 
is to contribute to mobilization of “…political will for a 
universal, ambitious and legally-binding climate change 
agreement by 2015.”1
Similar commitments were made at a meeting of 
a group of about 30 countries known as the Cartagena 
Dialogue held in Majuro in April of this year. As explained 
by Marshall Islands Foreign Minister Tony deBrum, 
the group “committed to bring forward our post-2020 
emission-reduction targets as early as possible next year 
in time to seal an ambitious new agreement in Paris, and 
to use the agreement to take vulnerability assessment and 
adaption planning to a new level globally.”2
1  See www.majurodeclaration.org. 
2  Quoted in Giff Johnson, “Majuro Cartagena Dialogue 
continued on page 4
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syncretism, tolerance, assimilation, and respectful exchange 
as it has been to war, bigotry, dominance, exploitation, 
fanaticism, stereotyping, suspicion, and the like.
 If this sounds rather abstract, it is not: in a very 
colorful way he cites the beliefs and actions of impactful 
figures from Mani to Kipling, Germaine Greer to W. E. B. 
DuBois, Pope Benedict XVI to the Emperor Qianlong, and 
investigates the Great War, the shifting and self-serving 
usages of “barbarism” and “civilization”, the Japanese push-
back against white racism, the uncertain character of the 
nation-state, and as they say, much more.
 It is not a quick read, but intellectually exhilarating--
quite a ride. For purposes of this publication, we will narrow 
our review to his treatment of nation and civilization, the 
principal purveyors of armed conflict; although in his 
treatment the role of religion is intertwined with both. 
 Regarding nation and its heir the Westphalian 
nation-state, Cannadine emphasizes that the very notion is 
constructed, elusive, and subject to constant revision and 
shoring up. The original term natio in Latin has a meaning 
closer to our “ethnicity”—a country almost always contains 
many—and the word “nationality” itself did not emerge until 
the 1790’s. The idea of nation almost always incorporates 
a creation myth that has been continuously refined in the 
absence of sufficient evidence, and draws its strength as much 
from carefully cultivated images of evil enemies and great 
battles fought, won or lost—definition by conflict--as from a 
positive celebration of a nation’s virtues. Drawn boundaries 
are critical—consider the Chinese word for country, guo, 
among the few characters that satisfy the pictographic 
cliché: a population and its armaments, contained by 
borders—and yet incredible sophistries, propaganda 
campaigns, commercial competition, and, at the extreme, 
state violence, are devoted to disrupting and redrawing this 
marker of sacred identity. And so we have thalassocracies 
dissolving (the Hanseatic League), colonial caprice (Iraq), 
homogeneous nations sundered (ROK/DPRK), and so on…
in the long view, an amoebic dance of power superseding all 
the nationalistic pieties.
 In the 19th century, economic and social trends, 
political leaders, and historians, too, nurtured the ideal of the 
nation-state as a “secular religion”, noted in the reflections 
of  historian Charles Maier as  “a ‘bordered political space,’” 
which created the essential framework for exploiting material 
resources, for wielding temporal power, and for nurturing 
common notions of national consciousness.” (Cannadine, 
p.68) This ideal was advanced by such means as the growth 
of nationally conformed education, the rise of mass political 
parties, protective tariffs, state welfare programs (beginning 
Book Review
The Undivided Past: Humanity Beyond Our Differences
David Cannadine
Published in United States by Vintage Books, A Division of 
Random House LLC, first paperback edition, January 2014: 
New York, New York
Vintage Trade Paperback ISBN: 978-0-307-38959-6
 Optimists working toward peace among nations, 
and security for the world’s peoples, are continuously 
challenged by a glum discourse that contains such 
commonplaces as there have always been wars; we are a 
violent, territorial species; sociopaths disproportionately seek 
power and drive events; resource scarcity is inevitable and 
engenders conflict…and the list goes on. 
 The book review following is the first in a series that 
look at works that appraise and refute such propositions, 
and consider a counter-narrative: hopeful but rigorous, 
current and synoptic assessments of our human nature, and 
our record of behavior. We will not be grasping at straws, 
but finding firm ground for optimism in such disciplines 
as history, evolutionary biology, psychology, and sociology. 
Comments and suggestions are invited.
 To the book in question, then: Professor David 
Cannadine is an eminent historian, with a senior teaching 
appointment at Princeton University. The Undivided Past 
is his attempt to provide a two-domain corrective. First, to 
his profession’s products, in that he feels academy-based 
historiography, as it has evolved, way too often defaults its 
focus toward conflict, difference, what is sometimes called 
“splittism” in analyzing the historical record of relations that 
are driven by human identity aggregations. He shows those 
groupings as typically being reduced to six identifications—
religion, nation, class, race, gender, and civilizations. And 
looking beyond the academy, and into the domain of 
political leadership and popular understanding, he spells 
out and decries the all-too-convenient uses and misuses of 
historical theorizing in general, and in the shaping of policy 
and mobilization of society. Those whose theories have 
been misunderstood and misapplied, in his view, comprise 
a who’s who of the discipline, including Gibbon, Spengler, 
Toynbee, and, over the boundary into political science but 
drawing on historical evidence, Samuel Huntington.
 What he seeks to show, in a clear-eyed examination 
that considers the record from the ancient city states and 
religions to the present day, is that the human enterprise 
has been every bit been as devoted to amity, compromise, [continued on page 8]
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A message from  
NGOCODPS President Bruce Knotts
 
 2014 is past and 
2015 brings opportunities 
and challenges for our com-
mittee. There is growing 
awareness of the importance 
of disarmament, peace and 
security issues and some of 
that, we believe, results from 
our programming, on-line 
and in-print publications.  
   
 We are noticing a growing concern over drones and 
other autonomous weapon systems. We see clearly what the 
proliferation of the types and numbers, and the lethal effec-
tiveness of weapons, is doing to people: men, women and 
children around the globe. These are non-combatants: in-
nocent civilians suffer more than anyone else from weapons 
sold to enrich investors and companies in the world’s wealth-
iest countries, harming many of the world’s poorest and most 
vulnerable.
  
 With renewed vigor, we commit ourselves to inform 
and advocate for the elimination of all such weapons and to 
turn our financial and intellectual assets towards peaceful 
endeavors The Quakers, probably more than any other faith, 
have consistently highlighted the opportunity costs of weap-
ons and military spending, which directly cause schools, 
hospitals, roads, parks, museums and concert halls not to be 
built or maintained so that the military industrial complex 
can continue to reap its bloody profits. We stand as people of 
faith shoulder to shoulder with secular activists to end war 
and the spending on weapons that rob us of opportunities to 
do what’s important, which is to make this a better world for 
generations to come.
 
 Let’s work together to make 2015 the year we make 
this world a better place.
 In Peace, 
 Bruce Knotts
Editor’s Note
 At a time of armed conflict in Southwest Asia, flare-
ups around Kashmir, horrific terrorist attacks in Paris and 
Yemen and a sobering trial in Boston, grim jockeying over 
Ukraine and senseless confrontations in the South China 
Sea, it seems strange to celebrate hope as the year turns into 
2015. And yet as the peace advocacy community rides the 
long arc of history, signs of a shift are appearing. We try to 
capture some of that in this issue. 
 
 The Republic of the Marshall Islands’ bringing suit in 
the International Criminal Court of Justice against the nu-
clear powers throws sharp focus on their fundamental vio-
lation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The suit will highlight 
the deadly game that world citizens continue to tolerate, at a 
crippling cost and unthinkable risk. Our article looks at this 
betrayal in an analysis of “good faith” in global negotiations. 
In another piece, deterrence theory is challenged. What is 
it worth? How can it be justified? As we went to press, such 
arguments as our author makes have received powerful en-
dorsement in the address of the Holy See at Vienna’s con-
ference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—a 
development we will explore further in our next issue.
 
 We conclude our two-part behavioral science analy-
sis of the inefficacy of the Bacteriological Weapons Conven-
tion. Our authors draw on the work of a notable organiza-
tional psychologist, Chris Argyris, to show the self-imposed 
constraints with which signatories thwart themselves, to our 
common detriment. A new book review series is also under-
way, featuring works rooted in research that examines the 
better angels of our nature.
 
 Finally, this issue incorporates our annual account-
ing of Conference on Disarmament member-state voting on 
GA resolutions relating to peace and security. This is an in-
formational service we are pleased to provide.
 
 Once again we encourage you to subscribe to our 
bimonthly e-NEWS edition free of charge…an email to dis-
armeditor@gmail.com is all it takes. As for the print edition 
in your hands, we invite comments, and suggestions for fu-
ture coverage…just mail to chuckrrose2@gmail.com. And by 
the way, we depend totally on subscriptions and donations 
to keep up and running. It is surprising how little in-depth 
analysis of our topics appears in the mainstream press. We 
are deeply grateful to our contributors for their knowledge 
and generosity—they are paid only by our thanks. As for you, 
dear reader, please support us by voting with your wallet!
Charles Rosenberg, Editor (Print)
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The Marshall Islands is also battling on another 
front. In April of this year, it filed applications in the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the nine 
nuclear-armed states, claiming that they are in violation of 
the international legal obligation to pursue in good faith 
and achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons. 
At the time, deBrum said: “Our people have suffered the 
catastrophic and irreparable damage of these weapons, 
and we vow to fight so that no one else on earth will ever 
again experience these atrocities.”3
For the Marshallese, global warming is truly an 
existential threat; the projected rise in the ocean will 
make their home islands unlivable, even disappear. 
And they know from first-hand experience the threat to 
everyone that nuclear weapons pose. The United States 
conducted 67 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in the 
Marshall Islands from 1946 to 1958 while it was a UN trust 
territory. The power of the 1954 “Castle Bravo” nuclear test 
was 1,000 times greater than the bomb that destroyed the 
city of Hiroshima. The health and environmental effects 
of the tests still plague the Marshallese today. US tests of 
missiles and anti-missile systems are also conducted in the 
Marshall Islands. The control center for the Ronald Reagan 
Test Site, a Pacific missile test range, is at Kwajalein Atoll.
So the Marshall Islands has compelling reasons 
to fight on both fronts. Their experience and example are 
instructive. First, the world as we now know and inhabit it 
is imperiled by both nuclear weapons and global warming. 
Second, nuclear disarmament and climate protection are 
both intrinsically global political and legal processes. They 
involve implementation of general obligations setting a 
framework for action contained in international legal 
agreements, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).
NPT Article VI requires the pursuit of 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating 
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament. The UNFCCC sets as the 
Wraps Up, Optimism Expressed,” Pacific Islands Report, April 7, 
2014, http://pidp.org/pireport/2014/April/04-07-06.htm. 
3  Quoted in “Marshall Islands Challenges Nine Nuclear-
Armed States in Lawsuit before the World Court,” Press Release, 
April 24, 2014, http://www.wagingpeace.org/pacific-nation-
challenges-nine-nuclear-armed-states-in-lawsuits-before-the-world-
court/. 
“ultimate objective” the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused] 
interference with the climate system.” It sets out general 
obligations, including that each developed state party 
“shall adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting 
its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and 
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs.” It also envisages further cooperative action, 
including the adoption of additional agreements.
In both arenas, a central question is whether states 
parties are acting in good faith to meet their obligations. 
That question is squarely raised by the Marshall Islands’ 
cases in the International Court of Justice, and also by the 
climate negotiations soon to be underway.
continued from page 1
Tony deBrum, Minister in Assistance to the President of 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, delivers the key note 
address at Waves of Change: Climate Change in the Pacific 
Islands and Implications for Hawai‘i
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The Marshall Islands’ Nuclear Zero Cases
The Marshall Islands’ filings mark the first time the 
ICJ has been asked to address issues relating to nuclear 
weapons since its 1996 advisory opinion. In that opinion, 
largely interpreting Article VI of the NPT, the Court 
unanimously concluded that there “exists an obligation to 
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict 
and effective international control.” The initiative comes 
at a time when there are no negotiations on cessation of 
the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, 
aside from modest US-Russian bilateral agreements on 
reductions, that has been the case for many years, dating 
back to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
Three cases are now in motion: those against the 
United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan. They are the states 
among the nine nuclear-armed states which have accepted 
the general (“compulsory”) jurisdiction of the ICJ. The 
Marshall Islands has invited the other states – the United 
States, France, Russia, China, DPRK, and Israel – to accept 
the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter and explain 
their view of the disarmament obligation. So far none 
have done so. The Marshall Islands also has a companion 
case against the United States in U.S. federal court in San 
Francisco.
In the UK case, a central issue is simple and stark: 
Is the UK’s opposition to General Assembly resolutions 
calling for commencement of multilateral negotiations 
on a nuclear weapons convention, and its refusal to 
participate in the 2013 UN Open-Ended Working Group 
on taking forward proposals for multilateral negotiations, 
a violation of the obligation to pursue negotiations on 
nuclear disarmament?
In the India and Pakistan cases, a threshold 
question is raised by the fact that those states are not 
parties to the NPT. The Marshall Islands holds that they 
are nonetheless bound by customary obligations arising 
out of NPT Article VI as well as the long history of UN 
resolutions on nuclear disarmament. The framing of the 
nuclear disarmament obligation in the ICJ’s 1996 advisory 
opinion and the Court’s underlying analysis strongly 
suggest that they are so bound, but the question remains 
to be explicitly determined.
In all three cases, important issues are raised 
by modernization of nuclear arsenals through their 
qualitative improvement and, for India and Pakistan, 
quantitative build-up and diversification. Among them: 
India and Pakistan call for commencement of negotiations 
on complete nuclear disarmament, but do not seek 
agreements that would, for example, cap the number 
and kind of delivery systems they possess. Is that posture 
a violation of the obligation to pursue negotiations on 
measures to halt the nuclear arms race? The same issue is 
raised by Pakistan’s refusal to allow negotiations to begin 
in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty cutting off 
production of fissile materials for weapons.
The UK, India, and Pakistan all are planning and 
spending for maintenance and modernization of forces and 
infrastructure over decades to come. Does that conduct 
undermine the achievement of the objectives of cessation 
of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament? If so, 
it would seem to violate the fundamental legal principle 
requiring that international legal obligations be performed 
in good faith.
The relief requested is a declaratory judgment of 
breach of obligations relating to nuclear disarmament and 
an order to take, within one year of the judgment, all steps 
necessary to comply with those obligations, including the 
pursuit, by initiation if necessary, of negotiations in good 
faith aimed at the conclusion of a convention on nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective 
international control.
The ICJ has set briefing schedules in the three active 
cases. Hearings on preliminary issues relating to whether 
the cases are suitable for decision by the Court probably 
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will take place by late 2015 or early 2016. Proceedings on 
the merits could take another two or three years. For the 
filings in the ICJ, media coverage, and presentations, see 
www.icj-cij.org, www.nuclearzero.org and www.lcnp.org/
RMI.
Negotiations on a New Climate Agreement
Pursuant to the UNFCCC, in 1997 the Kyoto 
Protocol, itself a treaty, was adopted. It provided that 
developed states parties were to reduce their collective 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 5% by 2010 compared 
to the year 1990. The United Statesnever became a party. 
Climate experts agree that the objective set by the Kyoto 
Protocol was much too modest. Global emissions have 
continued to climb, despite voluntary commitments on 
reductions made at annual meetings of the parties to the 
UNFCCC. In 2013, they rose by 2.3 percent, to a record 40 
billion tons.4
Now there is a process to create a post-Kyoto 
agreement, still under the umbrella of the UNFCCC. A 
meeting in Lima in December will work on a draft text, 
and the final agreement is supposed to be adopted in 
Paris late next year. Even the form the agreement will 
take is up for grabs. Thus it could be a protocol, a legally 
binding supplementary agreement to the UNFCCC, like 
the Kyoto Protocol. Or it could be “an outcome with legal 
force”,5 which could reaffirm basic UNFCCC obligations 
and set out political commitments regarding reductions 
of emissions, policies of adaptation to climate change, and 
financial support for developing countries.6
The Obama administration may prefer the latter 
or similar approach that would not require gaining Senate 
approval of a treaty. The Marshall Islands and most other 
states would clearly prefer a global treaty containing 
binding obligations on emission reductions and other 
substantive matters.
Negotiations on a new agreement – and other 
actions and policies as well – should be guided by the 
objective set by the UNFCCC: stabilization of greenhouse 
4  See David Wei, “Six Feet Above Sea Level: Marshall Islands 
and Climate Diplomacy,” Courier, The Stanley Foundation, October 
2014.
5  See “Durban: Towards full implementation of the 
UN Climate Change Convention,” http://unfccc.int/key_steps/
durban_outcomes/items/6825.php.
6  Cf. Coral Davenport, “Obama Pursuing Climate Accord in 
Lieu of Treaty,” New York Times, August 26, 2014.
gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate system. Indeed that is 
required by the legal principle pacta sunt servanda: a treaty 
is legally binding and must be performed in good faith. 
In this case that means negotiating within the UNFCCC 
process so as to achieve its objective; the same is also true 
of the NPT and its Article VI. Good faith in conducting 
negotiations requires among other things awareness of 
the interests of other parties; a persevering quest for an 
acceptable compromise, with a willingness to contemplate 
modification of one’s own position; and no undue delay or 
prolongation of the process.
Conclusion
In the seminal and too often forgotten 1978 Final 
Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, 
the General Assembly declared that states should “refrain 
from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the 
field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach 
to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.” 
That is the course of action the Marshall Islands is seeking 
to stimulate with its initiative in the International Court 
of Justice. The General Assembly’s injunction is a fitting 
guide as well for climate protection. In each field, the 
Marshall Islands exemplifies both what is at stake and the 
courage to fight for what is needed.
 John Burroughs is Executive Director of the New York-
based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy and a member 
of the Marshall Islands’ legal team in the cases before 
the International Court of Justice. This article draws 
on remarks he made at a September 20, 2014 Climate 
Convergence workshop, “Deadly Connections: Challenging 
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Climate Change” 
(seewww.wslfweb.org/deadlyconnections.htm  for videos of 
presentations).
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Different Paths to Peace
Former child soldiers headed for home, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, January 2009
Credit: UN Photo/Marie Frechon
continued on page 7
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in Bismarck’s Germany), the official promulgation of festivals 
and ceremonies, and the militarization of society at large, 
as distinct from the armed forces serving the needs of the 
royal household. All these phenomena made it feasible for a 
cohort of 19th century historians in Western nations, typified 
by Macaulay in Britain, Guizot in France, Parkman in the 
United States, and Ranke in Germany to write, as Cannadine 
observes “…narrative history (each) tracing the rise of his 
respective nation and insisting on its exceptionalism and 
providential blessing and thus its superiority to the rivals 
against whom it had often made war…” They “…provided 
the carefully selected collective memory that became an 
essential prop to this new and widely shared sense of national 
identity.” (Cannadine, p.70)
 When the bleak test case of modern national identity 
in the West was launched in August of 1914, a great deal of 
denial was required to reckon the Great War as a play among 
nations as advertised.  Consider language as a quintessential 
marker.  Half of French schoolchildren at the outbreak of the 
war spoke another language at home…mutually unintelligible 
dialects and patois, or, in border departments, Catalan, 
Flemish, or German. Italian unification, officially completed 
in 1871, created a polity in which, at the beginning of the 
War, less than 5% of the population was speaking Italian. 
Germany was also polyglot; Austria-Hungary, spectacularly 
so.
 What we would call the executive leadership of the 
participating countries, mostly regal, fails to stir the native 
blood as well. Queen Victoria and her consort: Germans 
whose extended families were significantly intermarried with 
Russian aristocracy. The Hohenzollerns themselves, who were 
at least as much Romanian as German, nonetheless, under a 
dubious constitutional reform, ruled both as kings of Prussia 
and emperors of Germany…confusing for the poor subject 
who receives a draft notice.  The Habsburgs, originating in 
an 11th century Swiss castle, over the centuries, in their two 
branches, succeeded in intermarrying with almost everyone 
and at various times supplied kings for a range of countries 
from Sicily to England to Hungary, as well as, in the person 
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the ruler of Austria-Hungary 
whose assassination triggered the war with Serbia and then 
the cascade into continental conflict.
 All in all, the Great War has the flavor of a family 
feud…but difficult to construe as among discrete nations 
led by royals, because the imperial factor prevailed. As 
Cannadine points out, “…Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Russia, and the Ottoman realms were not single-identity 
nations at all: they were land-based empires where many 
nationalities coexisted, with varying degrees of amity and 
success.” Further, France, Britain, and the United States had 
established maritime-based dominions, each with different 
political and emotional relations to the center. One has only 
to think of the varied perspectives of Cote d’Ivoirians, New 
Zealanders, and Filipinos. The outcome of imperial reach 
was more cultural diversity but a dilution of identity, and 
ambiguity in affiliation (the misuse of ANZAC troops in 
the Turkish and South African campaigns of the Great War 
remains an iconic source of controversy for some).
 But it was the imperial aspect which made it 
impossible for most Western nations to sit things out; of 
the European nations, only Spain, Switzerland, and the 
Scandinavian countries were able to resist participation. 
For some countries, like possessing nuclear weapons today, 
enlisting was a ticket to the important club…hence, Brazil, 
an independent country, went to war alongside the Entente. 
And almost all African countries were dragged in; only 
Ethiopia and the small North African colonies of Spain 
remained neutral. And, en suite, a key result of the War as 
world maelstrom was the dissolution through defeat of the 
German, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires.
 From the present perspective, it seems like a global 
fever, with terrible cost. And if the millions of human beings 
swept in seem compliant at this distance, that may be a 
distortion by broad brush. As this reviewer was reading up on 
the well-known anti-war poetry of British young men in the 
trenches (Brooke, Sassoon, Graves, and so on), he discovered 
a body of pro-war poetry and poster art devoted to shaming 
young men into enlisting…psychological mobilization. 
Evidently all were not so eager.
 Cannadine raises other factors that diluted the 
national identities of the late 19th century even as they were 
being molded, including the internationalization of business 
and communications (a European common market in 1860, 
and the first true international organizations that were 
dedicated to postal service and cable traffic); the expansion 
of significant expatriation, such as the German colony in 
Manchester; and the first substantial exchange of what we 
would call “best practices” today, in government services 
and business…the emergence of the “foreign expert” (other 
than the court musicians and jesters of old).  Ours is now the 
second round of globalization.
 His discussion of “civilizations” as a variant form of 
aggregated identity is if anything even more dismissive.  The 
term “civilization” itself is a late-comer, emerging in France 
during the Enlightenment, slowly gaining acceptability in 
England, and by the end of the 18th century becoming a cross-
Channel commonplace. “Zivilization” did not come into 
ascendency in Germany, however; Germans subordinated 
it to the preferred “Kultur”…this, not civilization, which 
sounded much more mechanistic and vulgar to Teutonic 
continued from page 2
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sensibility (he cites Thomas Mann, among others), was where 
the deep resonance of a people’s nature lay, their artistic and 
philosophical expressions, and their soul. Later, in Gibbon’s 
classic Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the concept of 
classical civilization (quintessentially the Roman republic, 
not the later imperial period) was counter-posed with the 
“barbarianism” of first the Goths, and then a congeries of 
peoples beyond Roman-controlled territory, who ultimately 
both conquered and reinvigorated Rome. 
 Like many folks, your reviewer had thought the term 
“barbarian” referred to the unbarbered, the bearded yahoos 
across the Mediterranean from the smooth-cheeked Attic 
Greeks. No, it is much worse, in fact a xenophobic insult to 
the languages of The Other, sounding in the superior ear as 
“ba-ba, bar-bar” babble, and thus an insult to its speakers. 
The insistence on difference does become embedded in 
inferiorizing language, with the dog radical integral to ancient 
Chinese names for Central Asians beyond the Great Wall, 
and of course in wartime emerges the tribalized sanctioning 
of ugly epithets, which need not be recorded here…you 
know the ones.
 In essence, the phenomenon is to define by difference 
and to dehumanize the threatening other, the better to 
defend against or, as desired, to conquer. Who, then, are 
“we”? Why the civilized ones, of course--those who embody 
the traditions and values of a great civilization. As Montaigne 
said, “Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own 
practice.” 
 By the early 20th century, variants of Gibbon’s model, 
further influenced by the emergence of the social sciences, 
especially anthropology and sociology (with an explosion of 
research into non-European peoples) began to map a world 
of civilizational pluralities and differences. None of this 
made a great deal of sense…there was a constant definitional 
sloshing about, with odd attributions and promotions and 
demotions in the works of Taggert, Spengler, and Toynbee. 
Leaders of the warring powers in both World Wars, however, 
exploited rhetoric that called for the defense of this or that 
civilized set of values. Most recently, political scientist Samuel 
Huntington, in response to an article by Bernard Lewis, 
adopted what turned out to be a Monster Meme, the Clash of 
Civilizations. And what does that mean, exactly? Huntington 
himself backed away from his original unconvincing lineup 
of Western, Latin American, Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, 
Japanese, Orthodox, African, and Buddhist. Although his 
intention seemed to have been to emphasize a prospective 
shift away from Western dominance, the taxonomy is 
clearly riddled with inconsistencies and curiosities, such as 
an India dubbed “Hindu” which has a secular constitution 
and the third-largest Muslim population on earth. Korea 
was put with China (“Sinic” in an amendment), but Japan 
comprises its own civilization. And so on. Cannadine guides 
us through Huntington’s considerable back-pedaling on 
such points, allows that he was really posing an admonition, 
not a probability of conflict, and provides a good account 
of why and how a vulgarized version was adopted by neo-
conservative supporters of the Iraq War.
 Throughout, the author’s tour of his six categories of 
identity is lively and persuasive. The Undivided Past is highly 
recommended. Professor Cannadine obliges us to revisit the 
history of wars and geopolitical antagonisms that we as non-
specialists thought we understood sufficiently, and guides us 
through a much richer and balanced alternative narrative. In 
graceful and occasionally mordant prose, he treats us to a 
past filled with fruitful interactions and cooperative efforts, 
and verifies and celebrates our common humanity.
 Charles Rosenberg
“From out there on the Moon, international 
politics look so petty. You want to grab a 
politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him 
a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at 
that, you SOB.’”
Edgar Mitchel, Apollo 14 astronaut, 8 April 1974.
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Nuclear Weapons Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Security Council
Permanent Members
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty A/RES/69/26 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 
the Middle East
A/RES/69/29 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapons 
States against threat/use
A/RES/69/30 125-0-56 Y A A A A Y A A A Y Y A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y A Y Y A A A Y A A A Y A A Y Y A A Y Y Y
Nuclear-weapon-free Southern hemisphere and 
adjacent areas
A/RES/69/35 173-4-3 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central 
Asia
A/RES/69/36 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Towards a nuclear weapon free world A/RES/69/37 169-7-5 A N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N - Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reducing nuclear danger A/RES/69/40 124-48-10 A N A N N Y A N N Y A N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y N A N Y N Y N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations
A/RES/69/41 154-5-20 A N N N N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear 
weapons systems
A/RES/69/42 166-4-11 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A - Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y
Follow-up to advisory opinion of ICJ on legality of 
threat or use
A/RES/69/43 134-23-23 Y N N N N Y Y A Y Y - N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y - A N N Y Y Y Y Y N N A Y - Y Y Y - Y N Y Y A Y Y N A A Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N A Y Y Y
Nuclear disarmament A/RES/69/48 121-44-17 Y N A N N Y Y N A Y - N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y N N N A Y Y Y A N N A Y - Y Y Y - Y N A Y N A Y N A N Y N A N Y A N Y Y N N Y Y Y
United action towards total elimination of nucle-
ar weapons 
A/RES/69/52 170-1-14 A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A N - Y A Y Y Y Y A Y A Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A
Follow-up to 2013 high-level meeting of GA on 
nuclear disarmament
A/RES/69/58 139-24-19 Y N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y A Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A N N Y Y Y Y Y N N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y A Y Y N A A Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y
Mongolia’s international security and nucle-
ar-weapon-free status
A/RES/69/63 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3rd Conference of States Parties & Signatories, 
Zones Treaties, Mongolia
A/RES/69/66 176-0-4 Y A Y A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons
A/RES/69/69 125-50-7 Y N A N N Y Y N N Y A N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y N A N Y N Y N Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y
Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East A/RES/69/78 161-5-18 Y A Y A N Y Y A Y Y Y A Y Y A N Y Y Y Y - Y Y A Y A A A Y Y Y Y N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty A/RES/69/81 179-1-3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N - Y Y Y Y Y Y AY Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y- Y
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain Key to vote: Y = yes, N = no, A = abstain, — = did not vote
Prohibition of the development and manufacture 
of new types of WMD
A/RES/69/27 174-2-1 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y
Prevention of an arms race in outer space A/RES/69/31 180-0-2 Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No first placement of weapons in outer space A/RES/69/32 126-4-46 Y A Y A N Y Y A A Y Y A Y A - A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A N A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y A Y Y A A A Y A Y A Y A A Y Y A N Y Y Y
Transparency & confidence-building measures in 
outer space activities
A/RES/69/38 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/69/39 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radio-
active sources
A/RES/69/50 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol
A/RES/69/53 178-0-2 Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Implementation of the Convention on Prohibi-
tion of Chemical Weapons
A/RES/69/38 181-0-1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Conventional Weapons Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in 
small arms
A/RES/69/33 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Implementing the Convention on the Prohibition 
of Anti-Personnel Mines
A/RES/69/34 164-0-17 Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A - Y A Y Y Y Y A Y A Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y
The Arms Trade Treaty A/RES/69/49 154-0-29 Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A - A A Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y A Y Y A Y Y Y A - A
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
in all its aspects
A/RES/69/51 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Effects of the use of armaments/ammunition 
containing depleted uranium
A/RES/69/57 150-4-27 - N A N N Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y A - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities A/RES/69/62 180-0-2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Convention on Prohibitions/Restrictions on 
Certain Conventional Weapons
A/RES/69/79 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Regional Disarmament and Security Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Regional disarmament A/RES/69/45 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Nuclear Weapons Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Security Council
Permanent Members
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty A/RES/69/26 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 
the Middle East
A/RES/69/29 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapons 
States against threat/use
A/RES/69/30 125-0-56 Y A A A A Y A A A Y Y A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y A Y Y A A A Y A A A Y A A Y Y A A Y Y Y
Nuclear-weapon-free Southern hemisphere and 
adjacent areas
A/RES/69/35 173-4-3 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central 
Asia
A/RES/69/36 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Towards a nuclear weapon free world A/RES/69/37 169-7-5 A N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N - Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Reducing nuclear danger A/RES/69/40 124-48-10 A N A N N Y A N N Y A N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y N A N Y N Y N Y N N Y Y N N Y Y Y
Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations
A/RES/69/41 154-5-20 A N N N N Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y
Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear 
weapons systems
A/RES/69/42 166-4-11 Y N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A - Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y
Follow-up to advisory opinion of ICJ on legality of 
threat or use
A/RES/69/43 134-23-23 Y N N N N Y Y A Y Y - N Y N Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y - A N N Y Y Y Y Y N N A Y - Y Y Y - Y N Y Y A Y Y N A A Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N A Y Y Y
Nuclear disarmament A/RES/69/48 121-44-17 Y N A N N Y Y N A Y - N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y N N N A Y Y Y A N N A Y - Y Y Y - Y N A Y N A Y N A N Y N A N Y A N Y Y N N Y Y Y
United action towards total elimination of nucle-
ar weapons 
A/RES/69/52 170-1-14 A Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A N - Y A Y Y Y Y A Y A Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A
Follow-up to 2013 high-level meeting of GA on 
nuclear disarmament
A/RES/69/58 139-24-19 Y N N N N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y A Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A N N Y Y Y Y Y N N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y A Y Y N A A Y N Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y
Mongolia’s international security and nucle-
ar-weapon-free status
A/RES/69/63 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3rd Conference of States Parties & Signatories, 
Zones Treaties, Mongolia
A/RES/69/66 176-0-4 Y A Y A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons
A/RES/69/69 125-50-7 Y N A N N Y Y N N Y A N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N N N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N Y Y N A N Y N Y N Y N N Y Y N Y Y Y
Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East A/RES/69/78 161-5-18 Y A Y A N Y Y A Y Y Y A Y Y A N Y Y Y Y - Y Y A Y A A A Y Y Y Y N A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty A/RES/69/81 179-1-3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N - Y Y Y Y Y Y AY Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y- Y
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain Key to vote: Y = yes, N = no, A = abstain, — = did not vote
Prohibition of the development and manufacture 
of new types of WMD
A/RES/69/27 174-2-1 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y
Prevention of an arms race in outer space A/RES/69/31 180-0-2 Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No first placement of weapons in outer space A/RES/69/32 126-4-46 Y A Y A N Y Y A A Y Y A Y A - A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A N A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y A Y Y A A A Y A Y A Y A A Y Y A N Y Y Y
Transparency & confidence-building measures in 
outer space activities
A/RES/69/38 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction
A/RES/69/39 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radio-
active sources
A/RES/69/50 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol
A/RES/69/53 178-0-2 Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Implementation of the Convention on Prohibi-
tion of Chemical Weapons
A/RES/69/38 181-0-1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Conventional Weapons Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Assistance to states for curbing the illicit traffic in 
small arms
A/RES/69/33 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Implementing the Convention on the Prohibition 
of Anti-Personnel Mines
A/RES/69/34 164-0-17 Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A - Y A Y Y Y Y A Y A Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y
The Arms Trade Treaty A/RES/69/49 154-0-29 Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A - A A Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y A Y Y A Y Y Y A - A
The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
in all its aspects
A/RES/69/51 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Effects of the use of armaments/ammunition 
containing depleted uranium
A/RES/69/57 150-4-27 - N A N N Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y A - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y
Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities A/RES/69/62 180-0-2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Convention on Prohibitions/Restrictions on 
Certain Conventional Weapons
A/RES/69/79 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Regional Disarmament and Security Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Regional disarmament A/RES/69/45 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12 / Disarmament Times
Note about the chart:  This chart shows voting records from the 69th U.N. General Assembly (2014) on issues of disarmament and international security. The countries 
shown are the 65 members of the Conference on Disarmament. A full listing of the resolutions of the General Assembly is available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/69/
resolutions.shtml. Additional information, including the First Committee Monitor, is available at www.reachingcriticalwill.org. This chart and past years’ voting charts are 
available at www.ngocdps.org
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Confidence-building measures in the regional 
and subregional context
A/RES/69/46 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Conventional arms control at the regional and 
subregional levels
A/RES/69/47 181-1-2 Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional confidence-building measures:  
Security questions in Central Africa
A/RES/69/73 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Strengthening security & cooperation in the 
Mediterranean region
A/RES/69/80 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other Disarmament Measures and Intl Security Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Information and telecommunications in interna-
tional security
A/C.1/69/28 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation
A/RES/69/44 162-1-17 A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A - Y A Y Y Y Y A A N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y - Y
Promotion of multilateralism in disarmament & 
non-proliferation
A/RES/69/54 131-5-49 Y A Y N N Y Y A A Y Y A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A N A A Y - Y Y Y Y Y A A Y A Y Y A A A Y A Y A Y A A Y Y A A Y Y Y
Observance of environmental norms in disarma-
ment agreements
A/RES/69/55 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Relationship between disarmament and devel-
opment
A/RES/69/56 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Compliance w non-proliferation/arms limitation/
disarmament agreements
A/RES/69/59 170-1-10 Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A - A A Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y A Y Y
Consolidation of peace through practical disar-
mament measures
A/RES/69/60 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and 
arms control
A/RES/69/61 183-0-0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y -
Information on confidence-building in the field of 
conventional arms
A/RES/69/64 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
United Nations study on disarmament and 
non-proliferation education
A/RES/69/65 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Disarmament Machinery and Programs Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
U.N. Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament 
in Asia and the Pacific
A/RES/69/68 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. regional centres for peace and disarmament A/RES/69/70 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. Disarmament Information Programme A/RES/69/71 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. Regional Centre for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
A/RES/69/72 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament 
in Africa
A/RES/69/74 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U. N. disarmament fellowship, training and 
advisory services
A/RES/69/75 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Report of the Conference on Disarmament A/RES/69/76 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Report of the Disarmament Commission A/RES/69/77 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Report of the Conference on Disarmament A/RES/69/64 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Disarmament Times / 13
The First Committee also adopted the following decisions in 2014’s fall session: Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 
(169-0-4), abstaining were France, Israel, United Kingdom, and United States; and Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices (173-1-5); Pakistan voted not; abstaining were Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syrian Arab Republic.
69th UN General Assembly
Action Initiated by the First Committee on
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Confidence-building measures in the regional 
and subregional context
A/RES/69/46 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Conventional arms control at the regional and 
subregional levels
A/RES/69/47 181-1-2 Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional confidence-building measures:  
Security questions in Central Africa
A/RES/69/73 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Strengthening security & cooperation in the 
Mediterranean region
A/RES/69/80 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Other Disarmament Measures and Intl Security Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
Information and telecommunications in interna-
tional security
A/C.1/69/28 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation
A/RES/69/44 162-1-17 A Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A - Y A Y Y Y Y A A N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y - Y
Promotion of multilateralism in disarmament & 
non-proliferation
A/RES/69/54 131-5-49 Y A Y N N Y Y A A Y Y A Y A Y A Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y A A A Y Y Y Y A N A A Y - Y Y Y Y Y A A Y A Y Y A A A Y A Y A Y A A Y Y A A Y Y Y
Observance of environmental norms in disarma-
ment agreements
A/RES/69/55 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Relationship between disarmament and devel-
opment
A/RES/69/56 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Compliance w non-proliferation/arms limitation/
disarmament agreements
A/RES/69/59 170-1-10 Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A - A A Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y A Y Y
Consolidation of peace through practical disar-
mament measures
A/RES/69/60 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and 
arms control
A/RES/69/61 183-0-0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y - Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y -
Information on confidence-building in the field of 
conventional arms
A/RES/69/64 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
United Nations study on disarmament and 
non-proliferation education
A/RES/69/65 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Disarmament Machinery and Programs Resolution # Yes-No-Abstain
U.N. Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament 
in Asia and the Pacific
A/RES/69/68 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. regional centres for peace and disarmament A/RES/69/70 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. Disarmament Information Programme A/RES/69/71 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. Regional Centre for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
A/RES/69/72 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U.N. Regional Centre for Peace & Disarmament 
in Africa
A/RES/69/74 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
U. N. disarmament fellowship, training and 
advisory services
A/RES/69/75 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Report of the Conference on Disarmament A/RES/69/76 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Report of the Disarmament Commission A/RES/69/77 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Report of the Conference on Disarmament A/RES/69/64 without vote - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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continued from page 1
counts as ‘normal’ understandings about nuclear weapons 
and nuclear practices. It is these regimes of nuclear truth 
that perpetuate the social-technological networks that 
continue to produce nuclear weapons. These networks 
comprise bureaucracies, technologies, industries, allies 
and politicians. They will not endure on their own but 
need to be continually reproduced over time. Narratives 
of nuclear truth that continue to assign multiple values to 
nuclear weapons facilitate this process. In fact, it is hard 
to imagine such networks holding together without these 
narratives. 3
 
 This dynamic is at work in Ukraine where advo-
cates of NATO’s nuclearized ‘strategic concept’ tell us the 
solution is more nuclear weapons to deter Russian ad-
venturism, Moscow threatens nuclear retaliation for any 
attempt to retake Crimea, and nuclear ‘realists’ lament 
Ukraine’s negotiated repatriation of its Soviet weapons 
to Russia in 1994.4 Russia’s annexation of Crimea and ag-
gressive destabilisation of Ukraine are framed as a funda-
mental challenge to the fabric of international order, an 
order that can only be maintained through Western mil-
itary might and the ultimate sanction of massive nuclear 
violence. Western and Russian strategic specialists in for-
eign and defence ministries and their associated think-
tanks have been quick to dust off a Cold War playbook 
and interpret contemporary events through a comfortably 
familiar lens. Nuclear weapons are revalidated through the 
resurgent language of strategic stability, alliance credibili-
ty, and realpolitik. They are valued as part of the solution 
to geopolitical threat rather than part of the problem for 
cooperative human security. Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
should not be condoned—they do indeed ride roughshod 
over hard won international norms and laws—but reduc-
ing the political violence in Ukraine to a Cold War redux 
not only re-values nuclear weapons in a narrow geopolit-
ical conception of state security, but also buries the com-
plex socio-political and economic origins of the crisis and 
the practical hopes of Ukrainians of all creeds for a better 
standard of living and political accountability. 
 
 Nuclear truths are therefore not self-evident but 
contingent. They are actively constructed as a discursive 
political act. It is important, then, to challenge received 
strategic ‘facts’ that insist on the necessity of nuclear weap-
ons for our security—to shine a light on the social and 
historical contingency of these nuclear ‘truths’ in order to 
create political space for different conceptions of security 
that do not rely on threats of appalling nuclear violence. 
To accomplish this we need to think about nuclear weap-
ons culturally and sociologically as well as politically and 
technologically.
 
 This is where the humanitarian impact of nucle-
ar weapons initiative is posing a real challenge to nuclear 
orthodoxy. It actively challenges the meanings assigned to 
nuclear weapons by reframing nuclear weapons discourse 
away from an agenda that privileges a glacially protracted 
nuclear force reductions process dominated by NPT nu-
clear-weapon state interaction, to one that includes seri-
ous consideration of the unacceptable humanitarian im-
pact of using nuclear weapons.5 In doing so the initiative is 
implicitly (and for some explicitly) seeking to delegitimise 
nuclear weapons as acceptable instruments of statecraft.6
 
 Nuclear weapons are valued in part because they 
are deemed legitimate to so value. If normative and legal 
changes were to render nuclear weapons wholly illegiti-
mate through explicit and widespread political and social 
stigmatisation, then the values assigned to nuclear weap-
ons would change.7 A growing coalition of non-nuclear 
weapon states and global civil society organisations have 
been working together to undermine the value of nucle-
ar weapons by stripping their use and possession of any 
legitimacy. This discourse builds on the informal stigma-
tisation of the use of nuclear weapons captured in the idea 
of a “nuclear taboo”.8 A number of those who drive this 
process are seeking to codify the normative illegitimacy of 
nuclear violence in a legal instrument that outlaws nuclear 
possession and use for all states.9  
 
 What we are witnessing, then, is the emergence of 
a fresh discourse on nuclear weapons that challenges the 
justifiability of the rules and norms that are used to legit-
imise the continued possession and potential use of nu-
clear weapons by invoking a different narrative of global 
society based on a different set of rules and norms.10  In 
short, the political authority of the humanitarian approach 
rests on the basic ‘cosmopolitan’ idea that we should place 
the individual and common humanity at the centre of our 
thinking about security, rather than the state, territory, 
and militarised conceptions of the ‘national interest’. It is 
part of a broader and ongoing international project to de-
velop and institutionalise a network of interlocking rules 
and norms that limit the indiscriminate and arbitrary use 
of power for advantage. This includes laws, regimes, rights 
and responsibilities that govern the conduct of war and 
proscribe unacceptable weapons.11 
 This approach gathered momentum with the for-
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mation of a coalition of states ahead of the 2010 NPT Re-
view Conference, following the successful negotiation of 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008. An 
emerging consensus was reflected in the Final Document 
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference that noted for the 
first time ‘the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of 
any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all 
States at all times to comply with applicable internation-
al law, including international humanitarian law.’12 It was 
followed by further statements at the 2012 and 2013 NPT 
PrepComs by Norway and Switzerland that gained ever 
more support. This led to a ground-breaking conference 
on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo 
in March 2013, to a second conference in Nayarit, Mexico, 
in February 2014, and now, a third conference in Vienna 
in December 2014. The ‘Joint statement on the humani-
tarian dimension of nuclear disarmament’ delivered at the 
2012 NPT PrepCom by Switzerland’s Ambassador, Benno 
Laggner, had 16 signatories.13 This expanded to 34 nations 
at the UN General Assembly First Committee in October 
2012 when Laggner delivered a similar statement.14 This 
more than doubled at the April 2013 NPT PrepCom to 80 
nations for the statement delivered by South Africa’s Am-
bassador, Abdul Minty.15 
 Ambassador Minty stated: ‘It is in the interest of 
the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are 
never used again, under any circumstances. The cata-
strophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether 
by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be adequate-
ly addressed. All efforts must be exerted to eliminate this 
threat. The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons 
will never be used again is through their total elimination. 
It is a shared responsibility of all States to prevent the use 
of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizon-
tal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, in-
cluding through fulfilling the objectives of the NPT and 
achieving its universality. The full implementation of the 
2010 Action Plan and previous outcomes aimed at achiev-
ing the objectives of the NPT must therefore not be post-
poned any further.’ 
 The Oslo conference hosted by the Norwegian 
government attracted 128 countries, as well as several UN 
organisations and the International Red Cross movement. 
The humanitarian disarmament narrative was reiterated at 
the UN General Assembly’s High Level Meeting on Nucle-
ar Disarmament in September 2013, the UN Open-Ended 
Working Group on multilateral nuclear disarmament that 
also reported in September 2013, and the UN General As-
sembly First Committee in October 2013.16 New Zealand 
delivered an additional ‘Joint statement on the humani-
tarian impact of nuclear weapons’ at the latter, this time 
sponsored by 125 countries.17 
 The narrative was further developed at the sec-
ond conference on ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear 
Weapons’ in Nayarit attended by 146 states. The human-
itarian consequences of nuclear conflict and compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law applicable in armed 
conflict were explicitly referenced in the 2014 NPT Pre-
paratory Committee meeting Chair’s concluding recom-
mendations to 2015 NPT Review Conference.18 A ‘Joint 
Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear 
Weapons’ was delivered by New Zealand at the General 
Assembly’s First Committee in October 2014, this time 
sponsored by 155 countries.19 Finally, 159 countries and 
many international organisations attended the third con-
ference in Vienna on 8-9 December 2014. The Austrian 
government closed the conference with a formal pledge to 
‘to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders, States, Inter-
national Organisations, the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movements, parliamentarians and civil soci-
ety, in efforts to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear 
weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian con-
sequences and associated risks’.20
 For the majority of the world, the risk of nuclear 
violence posed by the continued existence, proliferation, 
and modernisation of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. 
A growing coalition of states is no longer prepared to ac-
cept the slow and open-ended ‘step-by-step’ nuclear disar-
mament agenda endorsed by the nuclear weapons states. 
Their reaction, borne out of frustration, is challenging the 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons based on the unacceptable 
humanitarian consequences of the use these weapons. The 
legitimacy of nuclear weapons has been questioned since 
the beginning of the nuclear age. The humanitarian ini-
tiative is placing that sense of illegitimacy in a contem-
porary context, not least by questioning how a state can 
be committed to the threat and use of nuclear weapons 
with all their devastating consequences on the one hand, 
and committed to human rights, the rule of law, Millen-
nium Development Goals, human security, and interna-
tional order on the other. Supporters of the initiative are 
marshalling institutional and normative power to try and 
change the discourse on nuclear weapons and mobilise ir-
resistible pressure for significant change. 
 Their underlying argument is that a stable and se-
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cure global society does not need nuclear scaffolding--sim-
ply, that nuclear weapons constitute a continuing threat to 
global society rather than an inescapable structural neces-
sity. The challenge, then, is building the institutions, cul-
tures, and ways of thinking that enable the integration of 
rising powers into an ‘expanded global consensus’ in ways 
that do not run dangerous risks of catastrophic nuclear vi-
olence and perpetuate the statist, patriarchal, militarised 
‘necessity’ of nuclear weapons. In short, the project—and 
it is a noble one—is to strip nuclear weapons of value and 
legitimacy to ensure that we don’t collectively reproduce 
global structures of nuclear violence for another 70 years.
Dr Nick Ritchie is a Lecturer in International Security at the 
Department of Politics, University of York, UK. His research 
focuses on nuclear proliferation and disarmament and UK 
national security strategy. This article draws on ‘Valuing and 
Devaluing Nuclear Weapons’ published in the journal Con-
temporary Security Policy in 2013 and ‘Legitimising and 
Delegitimising Nuclear Weapons’ published as a chapter in a 
recent UNIDIR book on Viewing Nuclear Weapons Through 
a Humanitarian Lens in 2014.
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Confidence in the Biological 
Weapons Convention:
What is it?  
How can it be secured?
 Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould
 The Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) has defined biological weapons as cate-
gorically illegitimate. As such, this represents a ma-
jor achievement of the international community. And yet, 
in recent years, many States Parties to the BWC have ex-
pressed unease about its accomplishments and future di-
rection.
 A key topic of concern is confidence in the Con-
vention itself, and the role of Confidence Building Mea-
sures (CBMs) in securing confidence. As part of the polit-
ical obligations on governments, those party to the treaty 
are meant to complete CBM declarations each year. The 
stated intention of these declarations is to establish con-
fidence in the commitment of parties to the Convention. 
As Filippa Lentzos overviewed in the Spring/Summer is-
sue of Disarmament Times, in recent times, much of the 
consideration of confidence has been couched in terms of 
CBMs – and yet some states argue that they may even offer 
a distraction from finding more substantial means to build 
and secure confidence in the treaty.  In this article we con-
sider the limits of CBMs and ask what more is needed to 
establish and maintain confidence among States Parties.  
 Discussions about CBMs within the BWC since 
2007 have been preoccupied with significant -- but largely 
technical -- issues of how to improve the quality and the 
number of States Parties submissions.  It is our conten-
tion that promoting confidence requires something other 
than further discussion and further refinement.  Indeed, 
expending more energy on CBMs might ultimately prove 
counter-productive.  Instead of more of the same, alterna-
tive types of discussion needed to be nurtured. 
CONFIDENCE IN THE PAST 
 This conclusion follows from research conduct-
ed by the authors that took as its topic the way in which 
States Parties have dealt with declarations about past of-
fensive programmes. ‘Form F’ of the CBMs asks states to 
declare past offensive and defensive research and develop-
ment programs. While this is likely to be a sensitive issue 
for some states, forthright declarations about past pro-
grammes are part of states’ commitment to the treaty. Yet 
neither the declaration form itself, nor its contents, have 
been the subject of any significant attention in recent years 
by those party to the BWC.  
 We were interested in why this was the case, par-
ticularly since what is known publicly would suggest that 
several states with past major offensive programmes have 
failed to declare them, or have only declared limited as-
pects.  We found it difficult to reconcile the CBMs stated 
goals of transparency and building confidence with the 
limited attention given to the Form F declarations in BWC 
meetings.  We wanted to understand how this was tied to 
confidence in the BWC and belief in the value of CBMs.
 While several country cases could be used, we ex-
amined these issues in relation to the lack of a declara-
tion of South Africa’s past biological weapons programme. 
Under the code name Project Coast, between 1981 and 
1995 a chemical and biological warfare programme was 
established and maintained in South Africa.  This case was 
chosen because of the authors’ familiarity with it, and be-
cause significant detail about the programme is already in 
the public domain. In addition, the ideological and tem-
poral distance between the apartheid state and the current 
South African state,  as well as the positive contribution to 
the BWC made by South Africa for many years since the 
end of apartheid, meant this case was relatively open for 
examination.
 Despite this, not only has South Africa not de-
clared an offensive biological research and development 
programme under the Biological Weapons Convention, 
but little to no mention has been made of this non-recog-
nition within the proceedings of the Convention by other 
states, in the same way that little mention has been made 
about the absence of, or incompleteness, of other states’ 
CBM declarations.
INQUIRY INTO THE PRESENT
 In order to understand why this was the case and 
what it suggested about the origins of confidence, in 2013 
and 2014 we conducted 16 interviews with key individuals 
from South Africa as well as leading international contrib-
utors to recent CBM discussions.  From these we hoped to 
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hear what interviewees would (and would not) say about 
the history of the South African programme today, as well 
as what they thought what should (and should not) be said 
about it. 
 Our initial round of interviews suggested two im-
portant points.  One, our respondents offered substantially 
divergent assessments about fundamental issues, such as 
whether South Africa had an ‘offensive’ bioweapons pro-
gramme at all, as well as whether the lack of an declaration 
should be of concern. 
 Two, defensive reasoning was also prevalent.  In-
terviewees conveyed that in the course of their work they 
avoided making statements that were threatening or could 
cause political embarrassment to others. Upon reflection, 
we also noticed that we as researchers were engaging in 
such defensive behaviour ourselves.  Within the inter-
views we avoided issues we thought would be too person-
ally or professionally threatening, so as to maintain rap-
port. Neither we nor the interviewees mentioned, much 
less explored, the fact that this was taking place. 
 In light of such experiences we decided to take 
the prevalence of defensive reasoning as our focus.  In 
doing so we drew on the work of scholar Chris Argyris. 
Based on numerous ambitious and well-regarded efforts 
to foster organisational change, Argyris concluded that 
many forms of interaction foster self-reinforcing defen-
sive routines that inhibit robust inquiry.  Attempts to stay 
in control of situations and avoid oneself or others being 
threatened means there is often little testing of the basis 
for views and evaluations.  Defensive reasoning leads to 
the use of covert attributions of motives, scapegoating, the 
treatment of one’s own views as obvious and valid, and the 
use of unsupported evaluations. The common end result is 
the reproduction of (potentially invalid) assessments and 
inferences that decrease possibilities for changing think-
ing and behaviour, a kind of frozen state.
 One technique proposed by Argyris for exploring 
and altering learning patterns involves the production of 
‘Action Maps’. These seek to reveal the inter-related vari-
ables that individuals identify as relevant to their learn-
ing; notably those self-maintaining and self-reinforcing 
patterns that limit learning. The maps themselves also act 
as hypotheses to be debated and refined over time, and in 
this way Action Maps can provide the basis for building 
agreement about what is really taking place (and not), why, 
and what needs to be done to alter such circumstances. 
Change can be accomplished if Action Maps are used pa-
tiently and persistently in cycles of dialogue, reflection and 
intervention--their use can foster alternative behaviours 
and relationships within organizations and other groups.. 
 Figure 1 provides the Action Map we produced 
through the interviews and subsequent feedback pertain-
ing to why South Africa’s failure to declare an offensive 
programme has been ‘bypassed’ or made irrelevant within 
the BWC.
 The box on the extreme left sets out the general 
governing conditions that influence and inform interac-
tions between states. These conditions define possibilities 
for action, and constraints on action, by officials across 
the topics covered in the BWC.  The map then lists the 
factors specific to the case of South Africa that our inter-
viewees thought contributed to the lack of recognition or 
relevance of the past programme.  The map then identifies 
more general factors that led to some CBM-related con-
cerns becoming non-issues.  We then mapped the conse-
quences interviewees identified on group dynamics, which 
then have consequences for problem solving and decision 
making within the BWC.  
 For instance, anyone seeking to raise fundamental 
concerns about the contents of CBMs wrestle with a basic 
bind: if they raise points of concerns with what is (or is 
not) being discussed, then this is likely to be seen as polit-
ically motivated posturing. Drawing attention to awkward 
matters could also be seen as counterproductive to achiev-
ing positive reforms.  Yet if points of concern with what is 
(or is not) being discussed are not raised, then it is also not 
possible to achieve positive reform.  Within these difficult 
situations, frustration and withdrawal are likely.  Without 
the airing of varied perspectives, alternative options, and 
conflicting viewpoints, collective reasoning is impaired. 
All these factors taken together reduce confidence in the 
international prohibition.
 As indicated by the flow of arrows, each set of is-
sues shapes the others.  For instance, the inability to iden-
tify that there is a problem that ought to be addressed, at 
least in the eyes of some, makes it more difficult to build 
a process in which CBMs are discussed and, where neces-
sary, queried. This in turn hinders the ability to identify 
problems collectively, as there is no other multinational 
forum in which to raise it.
 As set out in this map, the ways in which the South 
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African past programme and declaration became non-is-
sues reflect a much wider set of countervailing pressures 
and competing imperatives within the BWC that have neg-
ative consequences for international relations and weapon 
prohibitions--including how little time and opportunity 
there is for collective discussion.  
Figure 1 Action Map
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MOVING INTO THE FUTURE
 A key prediction follows: in the absence of atten-
tion to what does and does not become the focus of at-
tention in the BWC today – and to the underlying and 
unstated assumptions that determine what is and what is 
not discussed, attempts to enhance confidence through 
greater participation in CBMs are likely to be of limited 
potential.  Indeed, without addressing why some matters 
become ‘non-issues’, greater participation in CBMs might 
well result in more matters being sealed off from consider-
ation because of defensive reasoning.  Rather than simply 
re-doubling efforts then, it is necessary to question what 
action should be undertaken.
 Since the production of this map, we have sought 
to use the formation and discussion of this map as basis for 
encouraging reflection among government officials, mem-
bers of civil society, and others about the role of CBMs in 
confidence building, and to use it as a basis for exploring 
what else, other than CBMs, might enhance confidence in 
the treaty. We invite readers to respond to us about the 
value and validity of the map.
 What the map shows is that the potential of CBMs 
to serve the purpose of building confidence is constrained 
by overarching conditions within the BWC. These are ex-
pressed in an ironic tension.  Under the defensive reason-
ing and action in the BWC, it is the lack of transparency 
that is often taken by those interviewed as a requirement 
for maintaining confidence.  As such there is no direct re-
lationship perceived between a lack of information shar-
ing and a lack of confidence.  And yet, in longer term, the 
incentives and disincentives associated with defensive rea-
soning were also regarded as having significant negative 
consequences that could, or have, undermined confidence 
in the international prohibition of biological weapons.
 Although the challenges of moving beyond en-
trenched and self-reinforcing defensive routines are con-
siderable, developments in arms control and disarmament 
more broadly suggest grounds for optimism.  In recent 
years a number of attempts have been made to devise fora 
that provide opportunities for non-traditional forms of in-
teraction between officials and civil society.  The Oslo Pro-
cess that led to the signing of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions in 2008, and the ongoing efforts to address the 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons outside 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
illustrate the ability of groupings of interested parties to 
devise novel forums for action.  In their substantive fo-
cus, location, governing rules, participation, and dura-
tion, such fora have provided a basis for taking forward 
demanding matters.  The hope is that similar novel and 
productive means of moving forward can be found for the 
BWC.
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Different Paths to Peace
Weapons ready for destruction by the UN Mission in South Sudan, December 2014
Credit: UN Photo/Isaac Billy
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AnnAls of UncertAinty
 From the beginning, engineering the first experimental nuclear explosive devices into 
stable weaponry, safe to its architects and handlers, was an enormous challenge. At the time of the 
U. S. attack on Japan, 2/3 of the weight of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was comprised of shielding to prevent 
nuclear detonation if hit by enemy fire. Later, developments in the sensitivity of the high explosives in the fission chain 
reduced this chance to nearly zero, so that the principal threat to nuclear safety was human error or misjudgment.
 And with all the sophisticated calculations by a group comprised of many of the world’s eminent scientists, the 
yield of these weapons could only be verified through tests. The power of the weapon detonated in the Castle Bravo 
test at Bikini Atoll came as a surprise; it was ultimately rated as the second-most powerful explosion ever. Here is a 
first-hand account excerpted from Richard Rhodes’ Dark Sun: The Making Of The Hydrogen Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 2012):
 On March 1 (1954), Los Alamos and Livermore initiated a new thermonuclear test series, …exploding the 
first lithium-deuteride-fueled US thermonuclear, a Los Alamos device called “Shrimp”… The…device used lithium 
enriched to 40 percent lithium6; it weighed a relatively portable 23,500 pounds and had been designed to fit the bomb 
bay of a B-47 when it was weaponized. It was expected to yield about five megatons, but the group at Los Alamos that 
had measured lithium fusion cross sections had used a technique that missed an important fusion reaction in lithium7, 
the other 60 percent of the Shrimp lithium fuel 
component. “They really didn’t know,” (physicist) 
Harold Agnew explains, “that with lithium7 there 
was an n, 2n reaction [i.e., one neutron entering a 
lithium nucleus knocked two neutrons out]. They 
missed it entirely. That’s why Shrimp went like 
gangbusters.” 
 Bravo exploded with a yield of fifteen 
megatons, the largest- yield thermonuclear 
device the US ever tested…the fireball 
expanded to nearly four miles in diameter. It 
engulfed its 7,500-foot diagnostic pipe array all 
the way out to the earth- banked instrument 
bunker, which barely survived. It trapped 
people in experiment bunkers well outside 
the expected limits of its effects and menaced 
task force ships far out at sea. “I was on a ship that 
was thirty miles away,” (Theoretical physicist) 
Marshall Rosenbluth remembers, “and we had 
this horrible white stuff raining out on us. I got 10 rads of radiation from it. It was pretty frightening. There was a huge 
fireball with these turbulent rolls going in and out. The thing was glowing. It looked to me like a diseased brain up in 
the sky. It spread until the edge of it looked as if it was almost directly overhead. It was a much more awesome sight 
than a puny little atomic bomb. It was a pretty sobering and shattering experience.” Bravo vaporized a crater 250 feet 
deep and 6,500 feet in diameter out of the atoll rock; Rosenbluth’s “horrible white stuff ” was calcium precipitated from 
vaporized coral.
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Different Paths to Peace
A Nuclear-Weapons-Free State
 With the final withdrawal of all Russian troops in 
September of 1992, Mongolia, a client state since the early 
20th century, and a de facto enemy of China, had a unique 
opportunity to assert its neutrality and cultivate friendly 
relations with its two nuclear power neighbors.
 President Punsalmaaagiin Ochirbat wasted no time 
in declaring that his country would seek to become the first 
single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone (SS-NWFZ). This 
unprecedented option (for other than groups of states, or 
a region) was supported by a study directed by the UN 
General Assembly through Resolution 3261 F. It did take 
until February 3, 2000 to fully enter into force.
 Under Mongolia’s treaty, any individual, legal 
person or any foreign State is prohibited on its territory 
from committing, initiating, or participating in a) 
developing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring, 
possessing, or having control over nuclear weapons; 
b) stationing or transporting nuclear weapons by any 
means (includes air space, land, waters, and sub-soil); 
and c) dumping or disposing nuclear weapons-grade 
radioactive material or nuclear waste. All  transhipment 
of such weaponry or materials is forbidden, and a full 
range of entities, national and international bodies, and, 
in addition, commissioned NGO’s and individuals, are 
empowered to verify compliance.
 Mongolia removed itself from the nuclear shadow 
and stands among those seeking to de-legitimize nuclear 
weapons.
